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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                            ---------- 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
     Plaintiff's claims for retaliatory discharge following her 
reports of sexual harassment were dismissed on summary judgment.  
Contrary to the district court, we conclude that there was 
sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that there was a causal link between plaintiff's 
complaint of sexual harassment and her termination.  We also 
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that 
plaintiff was discharged as a result of speech protected by the 
First Amendment. 
     We recognize that most complaints of sexual harassment are 
likely to have as their primary purpose the vindication of the 
private rights of the person offended.  However, a public 
employee's complaints of sexual harassment by a public official, 
because they disclose serious official malfeasance, are 
inherently of public concern even if made in a private forum.  
Unless the employee's interests in speaking out upon matters of 
public concern are outweighed by the public employer's interests 
in running an efficient workplace, the speech is protected under 
the First Amendment. 
                                I. 
     We begin by setting forth a brief "Cast of Characters" to 
serve as a reference and a guide through the complicated factual 
maze that follows.  All of the individuals listed below are 
employees of the County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania. 
          Beverly Azzaro           Plaintiff, employee of Dept. 
                                        of Development 
 
          Chuck Azzaro             Plaintiff's husband 
 
          George Braun             Director of Dept. of  
                                        Development (Hohman's 
                                        successor) 
 
          Donna Brusco             Employee of Dept. of Employee 
                                        Relations, close personal 
                                        friend of defendant 
                                        Fusaro 
 
          Tom Foerster             Defendant, County Commissioner 
 
          Tom Fox                  Plaintiff's supervisor 
 
          Wayne Fusaro             Defendant, Assistant to 
                                        Commissioner Foerster, 
                                        accused by plaintiff of 
                                        sexual harassment 
 
          Joe Hohman               Director of Dept. of  
                                        Development (prior to 
                                        Braun) 
 
          Don Kovac                Director of Dept. of Employee 
                                        Relations 
 
          Harry Kramer             Executive Assistant to 
                                        Commissioner Foerster 
 
          Sal Sirabella            County Director of  
                                        Administration 
           
                                A. 
     Plaintiff Beverly Azzaro worked for Allegheny County in 
various capacities from March, 1979 until June 19, 1992, when she 
was discharged from her position as marketing coordinator in the 
Allegheny County Department of Development.  Subsequently, she 
filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission alleging retaliatory discharge "because of 
[her] refusal to agree to sexual advances and subsequently [sic] 
complaint of unwelcomed sexual advances."  App. 104.   
     The circumstances of Azzaro's discharge are disputed by the 
parties.  According to Azzaro, the chain of events that resulted 
in her termination began on June 11, 1991--just over a year 
before she was discharged--when her husband, who was also 
employed by the County, had a verbal confrontation with employees 
of the County Department of Employee Relations regarding the 
manner in which the Azzaros' daughters were treated in connection 
with their applications for jobs as County lifeguards.  The 
Director of the Department of Employee Relations, Don Kovac, 
reported the incident to Harry Kramer, who is the Executive 
Assistant to County Commissioner Tom Foerster, indicating that 
his employees were upset by Mr. Azzaro's behavior.  Kramer 
instructed Wayne Fusaro, an assistant to Foerster who was 
acquainted with Mr. Azzaro, to speak with Mr. Azzaro and request 
that he apologize.  Accordingly, Fusaro dropped by Mr. Azzaro's 
office, and Mr. Azzaro apologized to the appropriate people.   
     Plaintiff Azzaro learned of these events a day or two later 
through her husband and through a co-worker, Donna Brusco, who 
had heard the story from Fusaro.  Plaintiff testified that 
Brusco told her that Fusaro had said Mr. Azzaro's job might be in 
danger as a result of the incident.  Fearing for her husband's 
position and hoping to smooth things over, plaintiff Azzaro went 
to Commissioner Foerster's offices to talk to Fusaro.     
     What happened after Azzaro entered Fusaro's office is the 
subject of some dispute.  Because we are obligated on summary 
judgment to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, we will present Azzaro's version of the events.  
Azzaro testified that she began to cry, and Fusaro drew near her.  
She became uncomfortable and made her way to a chair across the 
room.  Fusaro shut the office door and pulled a chair very close 
to hers.  He then began pulling open the lapels of her blazer, 
saying "let me see."  App. 120.  She tried to hold the blazer 
shut, telling him to stop and saying "[w]hat the hell is wrong 
with you," but he put his hand inside and pulled her blouse out 
of her slacks.  App. 121.  At that point, Azzaro rose, saying 
"what's wrong with you.  Stop it.  I'm here for the kids . . . ."  
Id.  She continued to try to evade Fusaro, standing when he sat 
down and sitting when he stood.  Suddenly, Fusaro unzipped his 
pants and put his hand inside the zipper.  Id.  Plaintiff stood 
up and said loudly, "[a]re you nuts."  App. 123.  As soon as 
plaintiff "got loud," Fusaro "assumed . . . [a] professional 
attitude."  Id.  Azzaro said, "I don't think you want Donna 
[Brusco] to know about this, do you, Wayne?"  Id.  Fusaro shook 
his head, then sat down at his desk and took a phone call.  After 
he hung up, he said, "Beverly, I want you to promise what 
happened here is never going to go any further."  App. 124.  
Plaintiff promised.   
     Fusaro denies all allegations of sexual assault or 
impropriety. 
     Plaintiff did not immediately report the incident.  She 
told her daughters of the incident on the day it occurred, 
however, and told her husband and a friend the following day.  
She and her husband decided at that time not to report the matter 
or pursue it further for fear that they could lose their jobs.  
Azzaro testified that she did tell several co-workers of the 
incident, including Mary Ionadi, Harry Rohm, Mark Patrick and 
Cheryl Zentgraf.  Donna Brusco testified that Azzaro also told 
Kevin O'Laughlin and Mickey Maycar, both of whom mentioned those 
conversations to Brusco.     
     Finally, in October 1991, Azzaro told her supervisor, Tom 
Fox, of the incident at a party during a discussion of the Anita 
Hill hearings.  Fox expressed shock and urged Azzaro to report 
it.  The following Monday, he called her into his office, asked 
her to repeat the story, and pressed her once again to report the 
incident to the Director of the Department of Development, Joe 
Hohman.  He told her that if she did not report it, he would be 
obliged to do so on his own.  Plaintiff asked him not to do so, 
telling him, "I . . . [am] scared for my job and my husband's 
job."  App. 163.  
     Subsequently, Fox told Hohman himself.  In so doing, he 
impressed upon Hohman that he was telling him in confidence and 
that Hohman should not take any action unless he felt that he had 
an obligation to do so as Director of the department.  Hohman 
told Fox that if Azzaro wanted to pursue the matter, she would 
have to report to him directly. 
     Meanwhile, Hohman was growing concerned that his 
relationship with Commissioner Foerster was deteriorating because 
Foerster no longer sought his input or advice.  Hohman scheduled 
a meeting with Commissioner Foerster in December, 1991 to address 
these concerns.  Foerster invited his assistants, Fusaro and 
Kramer, to attend.  During the course of the meeting, Hohman 
stated that he "had problems with the people [Foerster] was 
surrounding himself" with, such as Wayne Fusaro.  Hohman 
testified that he said at the meeting, 
     Wayne Fusaro . . . potentially has a sexual harassment 
     case coming against him from an employee in my office 
     who I cannot name because the employee has not given me 
     permission to name, but it occurred right upstairs in 
     this office, Commissioner, over a summer job for her 
     daughters. 
 
App. 361-63.  Both Foerster and Kramer offered a slightly 
different account, testifying that Hohman mentioned a possible 
lawsuit against Fusaro but did not say that it concerned 
allegations of sexual harassment or offer any other details 
regarding the incident or the alleged victim.  However, both men 
had testified under oath in a previous, related case that Hohman 
accused Fusaro of sexual harassment at that meeting.  It is 
uncontroverted that Hohman neither mentioned Azzaro's name nor 
offered any substantive details of the incident. 
     While this meeting was taking place, Azzaro reported the 
incident to the County Director of Administration, Sal Sirabella.  
Under the County's sexual harassment policy, the Director of 
Administration is the official ultimately responsible for 
reviewing reports of sexual harassment and deciding what official 
action to take.  Azzaro testified that she went to Sirabella 
because he was an official in "high office" whom she could trust.  
App. 143.  When he asked what she wanted him to do, she replied: 
"I don't know what to do.  That's why I'm here."  App. 146-47.  
Sirabella allegedly replied, "[L]et's leave it alone for now . . 
. ."  App. 147.  Azzaro testified that she did not ask Sirabella 
to keep their conversation confidential.  According to Sirabella, 
however, Azzaro asked him to keep the content of their 
conversation confidential.  Azzaro's husband, who attended the 
meeting with Sirabella, also indicated that he thought his wife 
told Sirabella that "she'd prefer him to keep it confidential."  
App. 225.  Sirabella did not take any action or discuss Azzaro's 
allegations with anyone.   
     That evening, Donna Brusco phoned Azzaro at home.  She had 
spoken to Fusaro about the incident in Commissioner Foerster's 
office, and told Azzaro that Joe Hohman had been in Commissioner 
Foerster's office that day, that he had been "extremely upset," 
and that he "was screaming at Commissioner Foerster that Wayne 
[Fusaro] was a pervert."  App. 168.  Brusco said that Fusaro had 
been too upset to tell her all the details.  She then asked 
Azzaro why she had gone to see Sirabella that day.  Subsequently, 
according to Sirabella, Fusaro asked Sirabella "three or four 
times" what the purpose of Azzaro's visit had been.  App. 172.   
                          B. Termination 
     Azzaro alleges that she was fired in retaliation for her 
actions in the aftermath of the Fusaro incident.  According to 
Azzaro, this retaliation was engineered by Fusaro and Brusco, who 
share a close personal relationship.  Fusaro began by calling Don 
Kovac, who was the Director of Employee Relations during the 
relevant time period and was responsible for coordinating 
personnel activity for all county employees.  Fusaro told Kovac 
that he suspected that the Department of Development, where 
Azzaro worked, had employees on the payroll who were disloyal to 
Commissioner Foerster.  He asked Kovac to allow Donna Brusco and 
another member of the Employee Relations Department to "review 
the entire payroll in the Department of Development to pick out 
people that were loyal to Foerster and people that were loyal to 
Brimmeier," who was Foerster's opponent.  App. 417.  Because 
Brusco had worked for the Department of Development until she was 
transferred to the Employee Relations Department at Fusaro's 
request in the fall of 1991, she was ostensibly familiar with the 
entire Department of Development payroll and aware of people's 
loyalties.  Fusaro told Kovac that he had authorization to 
compile the list from both Commissioner Foerster and his 
assistant, Harry Kramer.  Accordingly, Kovac granted his 
permission and appointed John Chapman, another employee of the 
Employee Relations Department, to assist Brusco.    
     Approximately eight to ten weeks prior to Azzaro's 
termination, Chapman and Brusco reviewed the list of Department 
of Development employees in accordance with Fusaro's request.  As 
they did so, Brusco identified certain names as pro-Foerster or 
anti-Foerster.  Azzaro alleges that the list of anti-Foerster 
names was a "hit list" and that she was a target.  Appellant's 
Brief at 11.  Indeed, Chapman testified that he had heard Fusaro 
say on more than one occasion that Brimmeier supporters would be 
"retaliated against."  App. 273.  When Chapman and Brusco reached 
Azzaro's name, according to Chapman, Brusco said, "We're going to 
get this bitch."  App. 274.   On June 19, 1992, George Braun, who 
had replaced Hohman as Director of the Department of Development, 
told Azzaro that her position would be eliminated as of August 1 
due to budgetary reasons unrelated to her job performance.  
According to the explanation offered by Braun and asserted by 
defendants in this case, the elimination of Azzaro's position was 
motivated by a directive of the federal Department of Housing and 
Urban Development that required the county Department of 
Development to reduce the portion of its budget dedicated to 
administrative expenses by two or three percent in order to 
retain its federal funding.  While this same federal directive 
had been in place during Hohman's tenure as Director of the 
Department of Development, Hohman had not taken steps to address 
it because he believed the problem would correct itself over 
time.     
     After Braun took over as Director of Development in March 
1992, the Department of Development entered into an agreement 
with HUD which required Development to spend less than the 
permitted amount on administrative expenses for three years to 
offset excess administrative expenditures in prior years.  Braun 
sought to satisfy the terms of this agreement by reorganizing the 
Department of Development.  He drafted a proposal to merge 
together several divisions and eliminate the Marketing Division, 
in which Azzaro worked.  Under the heading "Positions to be 
Terminated," the proposal specifically named Azzaro and Tom Fox, 
the supervisor to whom she had reported the incident, along with 
two employees whose pensions had already vested.  App. 31.  At 
the same time, the proposal recommended hiring nine new employees 
and increasing the salaries of eight others.     
     Braun submitted this proposal to Commissioner Foerster's 
assistant, Harry Kramer, who approved it and passed it on to the 
Salary Board.  On June 18, 1992, the Salary Board approved the 
proposed restructuring of the Department of Development.  The 
following day, more than one year after the alleged harassment 
took place, Azzaro was discharged.  
                           C. Pretext  
     Azzaro maintains that defendants' explanation is purely 
pretextual.  To support her argument, she points to evidence that 
the county's action in pulling her position out from under her 
and making no effort to place her elsewhere was unprecedented.  
Although the county had fairly frequently eliminated vacant 
positions in the past, only once in the preceding fourteen years 
had it eliminated staffed positions--and those staffed jobs, 
unlike Azzaro's, had been designated from the outset as temporary 
positions.  Moreover, the Department of Employee Relations had 
"made every attempt to place" the displaced employees in new 
positions for the county.  App. 407.  In Azzaro's case, by 
contrast, no attempt was made to retain her as a county employee, 
notwithstanding the fact that there were hundreds of unfilled 
county positions available at the time.     
     Azzaro further argues that the county's excess 
administrative spending could have been reduced over time through 
attrition.  She points out that Hohman, whom Braun succeeded as 
Director of Development, had believed that the problem could be 
addressed without layoffs.  The Letter of Agreement that HUD and 
the county executed in May, 1992 required the county to make up 
for the excess expenditures over a four-year "mitigation period."  
App. 96.  By the end of fiscal 1992, however, the county had 
already reduced spending sufficiently to solve the problem and 
compensate the government for the excess expenditures of the 
past.  Azzaro cites these facts as evidence that her termination 
was not necessary to bring the county into compliance with the 
HUD directive, and concludes that defendant's explanation of her 
termination as a budgetary necessity is purely pretextual. 
                               II. 
     In September, 1993, Beverly Azzaro filed a three-count 
complaint in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania against the County of Allegheny, 
Commissioner Tom Foerster, and Wayne Fusaro.  Count I asserts a 
claim against all defendants under 42 U.S.C.  1983 for 
infringement of her First Amendment rights; Count II alleges 
retaliatory discharge against Allegheny County in violation of 42 
U.S.C.  2000(e); and Count III alleges violations of the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 42 P.S.  955(a), (d) & (e), 
against Allegheny County.   
     Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment which 
the district court granted, deciding Counts I and II on the 
merits and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's state-law claims.  Plaintiff filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1291, which grants us jurisdiction over appeals from 
final orders of federal district courts.  The district court had 
jurisdiction over the federal causes of action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1331, and had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's 
state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1367(a). 
                               III. 
     We exercise plenary review over a district court's decision 
to grant summary judgment.  Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. 
Bituminous Casualty Corp., 851 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1988).  In 
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, we are 
required to apply the same test that the district court should 
have applied initially.  Id.   
     A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if "there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56(c).  A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the 
dispute.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986).  The task of the court at the summary judgment stage is 
"not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the 
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for 
trial."  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.  Thus, we must resolve all 
reasonable doubts in favor of the non-moving party.  Meyer v. 
Riegel Products Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983).   
                        A. Title VII Claim 
     To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory firing in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
 2000(e), a plaintiff must establish that (1) she engaged in a 
protected activity; (2) she was discharged after or 
contemporaneously with that activity; and (3) there was a causal 
link between the protected activity and the firing.  Quiroga v. 
Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
940 (1992).  Because Title VII places the burden of persuasion on 
the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if 
it can show that the plaintiff is unable to establish one or more 
of the elements of this prima facie case.  Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 
873 F.2d 701, 707 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 
(1990).  In this case, the district court concluded that Azzaro 
had failed to bring forward any competent evidence of a causal 
connection between her allegations of sexual harassment and her 
discharge, and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants.  Azzaro v. County of Allegheny et al., No. 93-1589, 
slip op. at 19 (W.D. Pa. filed March 31, 1995). 
     As neither party challenges the district court's conclusions 
with respect to the first two elements of the prima facie case 
for retaliatory discharge, we will address them only briefly.  
First, under the EEOC's Guidelines, an employee's opposition to 
any unlawful employment practice is protected.  Magnuson v. Peak 
Technical Services, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 515 n.13 (E.D. Va. 
1992) (citing EEOC Compliance Manual, 704(a) Discrimination,  
492.2(e)), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1244, 1994 WL 619727 (4th Cir. 1994).  
Therefore, Azzaro's actions in reporting the incident with Fusaro 
clearly constitute a protected activity within the meaning of 
Title VII.  As it is undisputed that Azzaro lost her job, she 
satisfies the second requirement of Title VII as well.  
     The controversy swirls around the third prong of the test: 
causation.  The district court granted summary judgment on the 
ground that plaintiff could not establish a causal link between 
the protected activity and her discharge, because "there is no 
competent evidence that those persons involved in the decision to 
reorganize the DOD were aware of the alleged sexual harassment 
prior to the approval of the reorganization."  Azzaro, No. 93- 
1589, at 19.  We disagree. 
     To establish a causal connection sufficient to state a prima 
facie case of retaliatory discharge under Title VII, a plaintiff 
must proffer "evidence sufficient to raise the inference that the 
protected activity was likely the reason for the adverse action."  
Zanders v. National Railroad Passenger Co., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 
(6th Cir. 1990).  In this case, plaintiff proffered the following 
evidence in support of her theory of retaliation.  First, she 
produced evidence showing that Hohman stated at a meeting with 
Foerster, Fusaro and Kramer that Fusaro sexually harassed a 
Department of Development employee in connection with an incident 
regarding summer jobs for her daughters.  As both Fusaro and 
Kramer had been informed of the incident with Azzaro's husband 
and had been involved in resolving the dispute, Hohman's 
statement is sufficient to support a finding that Fusaro and 
Kramer knew of Azzaro's allegations.  Moreover, since Fusaro and 
Kramer were close personal advisors of Foerster and since 
Foerster was present at the meeting, a reasonable jury could find 
that it is more probable than not that Foerster, too, knew or 
later learned that Azzaro was the employee in question. 
     Second, plaintiff produced evidence that Fusaro, upon 
learning of plaintiff's meeting with Sirabella, asked Sirabella 
what the meeting was about, and that Brusco called plaintiff to 
make the same inquiry.  A jury could reasonably infer from this 
evidence, and from the evidence discussed above about the meeting 
among Hohman, Fusaro, Kramer and Foerster, that Fusaro believed 
plaintiff had broken her promise not to disclose the incident, 
and that Fusaro accordingly arranged to terminate plaintiff in 
retaliation.  
     Third, plaintiff proffered evidence that, following the 
alleged harassment, her name was placed on a "hit list" of 
Department of Development employees which was compiled by 
Fusaro's close friend and ally, Donna Brusco, at Fusaro's 
request. 
     Fourth, she brought forward uncontroverted evidence showing 
that defendants' action in eliminating her position was 
unprecedented in county history and contravened established 
principles regarding the treatment of county personnel. 
     Fifth, she proffered evidence that defendants' stated reason 
for eliminating her position and discharging her was pretextual.  
The evidence demonstrated that the administrative cost overrun 
could have been corrected by attrition, without layoffs; that the 
reorganization plan which resulted in Azzaro's termination also 
recommended nine new hires and eight salary increases; that 
drastic measures were not necessary because the Department had 
four years to solve the budget problem; that the problem had been 
fully addressed by the end of 1992, two years earlier than was 
required; and that Azzaro was the only employee in the last 
fourteen years whose position was eliminated and who was not 
offered a transfer to a different county position.  We believe 
that these contentions are more than sufficient to support a 
finding that the defendants' alleged reason for discharging 
Azzaro was a pretext. 
     It is true, as defendants point out, that plaintiff did not 
produce any direct evidence that Director of Development Braun, 
who drafted the reorganization plan that resulted in Azzaro's 
discharge, knew of Azzaro's allegations or acted in concert with 
the defendants.  In light of the ample evidence that plaintiff 
produced suggesting that Braun's justification for his 
recommended action was pretextual, however, we conclude that 
granting summary judgment against plaintiff for failure to 
produce direct evidence of Braun's knowledge is inappropriate.  
Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to support a finding 
in her favor by a reasonable factfinder, and she should be 
allowed to proceed. 
                      B. Section 1983 Claim 
     Count I of the complaint alleges that plaintiff was 
discharged as a result of protected speech in violation of the 
First Amendment and section 1983.  We employ a three-step 
analysis to determine whether a public employee was fired as a 
result of protected speech.  Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 
1258, 1270 (3d Cir. 1994).  First, plaintiff must establish that 
she was engaged in a protected activity.  Id.  If she succeeds, 
then she must show that the protected activity was a "substantial 
or motivating factor in her discharge."  Id.  A plaintiff who 
satisfies both of these burdens will prevail unless the defendant 
then proves that it would have fired the employee regardless of 
the protected speech.  Id.  The district court granted summary 
judgment on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to satisfy 
either of the first two prongs of the Swineford test.  We will 
examine each in turn. 
                                1. 
     To determine whether plaintiff engaged in a protected 
activity, we engage in a two-step inquiry.  First, we determine 
whether her speech was related to a matter of public concern.  
Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1270.  If the answer is no, then 
plaintiff's speech is not protected and our inquiry is at an end.  
Id. at 1273 n.13.  If the answer is yes, then we proceed to the 
second step of the inquiry: "balancing the public employee's 
interests in commenting on matters of public concern against the 
public employer's interests in efficiency."  Id. at 1270.  If the 
employee's interest in speaking on a matter of public concern 
outweighs the employer's interest in providing efficient 
services, then the speech is protected under the First Amendment.  
The district court ruled that plaintiff's speech was not related 
to a matter of public concern and granted summary judgment on 
that basis without reaching the second part of the inquiry into 
whether plaintiff's speech is protected.  Accordingly, we will 
confine our analysis to that issue. 
     Just what constitutes a matter of public concern for First 
Amendment purposes has never been precisely defined.  SeeSanguini v. 
Pittsburgh Board of Public Educ., 968 F.2d 393 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  While it is axiomatic that "matters only of personal 
interest" do not constitute matters of public concern, Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983), there is no bright line rule or 
test that can be applied to determine when speech is personal in 
nature and when it is public.  Instead, the determination of 
whether speech is related to a matter of public concern involves 
an inquiry into the "content, form, and context of a given 
statement, as revealed by the whole record."  Connick, 461 U.S. 
at 147-48. 
     Where, as here, the speaker is a public employee, the First 
Amendment inquiry is somewhat more refined.  This court has 
stated that "speech by public employees is deemed to be speech 
about public concern when it relates to their employment so long 
as it is not speech upon matters of only personal interest."  
Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1271.  Thus, as Mrs. Azzaro is a public 
employee and the speech at issue relates to her employment, her 
speech will be protected under the Swineford rule unless it is 
limited to matters of only personal interest. 
     The public and the personal often overlap, however, and the 
line between the two is rarely distinct.  The distinction is 
especially blurry in the context of speech regarding sexual 
harassment.  As a general matter, we believe that the topic of 
sexual harassment of employees by a public official is one 
"inherently of public concern."   Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8 
(noting that racial discrimination is a matter inherently of 
public concern); Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 
1987) (extending that principle to speech regarding sexual 
harassment).  At the same time, however, speech alleging sexual 
harassment is almost always personal in nature.  It therefore 
seems inevitable that speech regarding sexual harassment will 
involve elements of both public and private interest.     
     In sorting out the public and private elements of speech, 
the Supreme Court has occasionally looked to see whether the 
speech arose in the context of a personal employment dispute.  
See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 & n.8; Givhan v. Western Line 
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).  The Court relied most 
heavily on this factor in Connick v. Myers.  Connick involved an 
Assistant District Attorney who opposed the District Attorney's 
attempt to transfer her to a different division of the criminal 
court.  As part of her efforts to resist the transfer, she 
prepared and distributed a questionnaire soliciting the views of 
her co-workers concerning office transfer policy, morale, 
confidence in supervisors, whether a grievance committee should 
be instituted, and whether employees felt pressured to work on 
political campaigns.  461 U.S. at 140-41.  Subsequently, due to 
her distribution of the questionnaire, she was fired. 
     The Court found that the questions, with one exception, were 
mere "extensions of Myers' dispute over her transfer to another 
section of the criminal court" and were not "of public import in 
evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected 
official."  The Court reasoned that  
     Myers did not seek to inform the public that the 
     District Attorney's Office was not discharging its 
     governmental responsibilities in the investigation and 
     prosecution of criminal cases.  Nor did Myers seek to 
     bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach 
     of public trust on the part of Connick and others.  
     Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, 
     would convey no information at all other than the fact 
     that a single employee is upset with the status quo. . 
     . .  [T]he focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate 
     the performance of the office but rather to gather 
     ammunition for another round of controversy with her 
     superiors.  These questions reflect one employee's 
     dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn 
     that displeasure into a cause celebre. 
           
Id. at 148.  The Court concluded that "the First Amendment does 
not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for 
employee complaints over internal office affairs."  Id. at 149. 
     In addition, the Court suggested in a footnote that its 
holding in a prior First Amendment case, Givhan v. Western Line 
Consol. Sch. Dist., turned in part on the fact that the speech at 
issue was not tied to a personal employment dispute, although 
this had not been mentioned as a factor in the opinion itself.  
Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8.  In Givhan, the Court held that 
complaints regarding racial discrimination in a school district's 
hiring process, voiced privately by a teacher to the school 
principal, were protected speech.  Discussing this holding in 
Connick, the Court explained that the speech at issue in Givhanwas 
protected despite the choice of a private forum because it 
addressed a matter "inherently of public concern" and was "not 
tied to a personal employment dispute."  461 U.S. at 148 n.8.  
The implication of this footnote is that the speech in Givhanwould not 
have been protected had it been "tied to a personal 
employment dispute." 
     Although the Court has never precisely defined the phrase 
"tied to a personal employment dispute," it seems clear from the 
facts of Connick that the phrase refers to speech by a public 
employee that is wholly tied to such a dispute without any 
broader public element.  This conclusion is based on the fact 
that, although all of the speech involved in Connick arose from a 
personal employment dispute and was apparently intended to 
further the interests of the employee in that dispute, the Court 
nevertheless found that one component of that speech was 
protected because it "touch[ed] upon a matter of public concern."  
461 U.S. at 149.  The combined message of Connick and Givhan, 
therefore, is that speaking on a topic "inherently of public 
concern," id., in and of itself, does not entitle a public 
employee to First Amendment protection; rather, a public employee 
must speak out at least partly "as a citizen" on such a topic, 
and not purely "as an employee upon matters only of personal 
interest," in order to gain protection.  Id. at 147 (emphasis 
added); see United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 
115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013 (1995) (noting that "speech that involves 
nothing more than a complaint about a change in the employee's 
own duties" is not protected).  In other words, if an employee 
speaks on a topic--such as racism or sexual harassment--that is 
inherently of public concern, but her speech is "tied to a 
personal employment dispute" and does not transcend that dispute, 
her speech is not protected.  Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8.   
     Because sexual harassment in the workplace, by its very 
nature, is an employment issue, speech regarding such sexual 
harassment is highly likely to arise in the context of a personal 
employment dispute.  The Court has never spoken on the issue of 
whether or under what circumstances sexual harassment allegations 
constitute speech on a matter of public concern, however, and 
thus has not addressed the relevance of personal employment 
disputes to the determination of whether such allegations are 
personal or public in nature.  Those lower courts that have 
addressed the protected status of sexual harassment allegations 
have all but unanimously concluded that such allegations are not 
protected unless the speaker takes some measure to expand her 
speech beyond the context of the personal employment dispute in 
which it arose or to give it broader relevance.  This may include 
speaking in a manner that exposes official malfeasance, warning 
other employees to prevent them from undergoing a similar ordeal, 
or voicing a private complaint about systemic sexual harassment.  
     For example, in Callaway v. Hafeman, where an employee of 
the Madison, Wisconsin school district alleged that she had been 
harassed by the district's Public Relations Director, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that allegations of harassment which are 
"limited . . . to oral statements intended to be purely 
confidential" are not matters of public concern.  832 F.2d at 
417.  The court reasoned that, "[w]hile the content of Callaway's 
communications touched upon an issue of public concern generally, 
she was not attempting to speak out as a citizen concerned with 
problems facing the school district; instead, she spoke as an 
employee attempting to resolve her private dilemma."  Id.  Under 
the Seventh Circuit's analysis, it appears that allegations of 
sexual harassment leveled against a public official are not 
protected unless the plaintiff treats them as a social problem as 
well as a personal one; the plaintiff's confidential, internal 
complaints regarding her personal employment dispute did not rise 
to the level of speech that discloses official malfeasance. 
     In Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994), the Second Circuit 
found that a public employee's complaints of sexual harassment, 
voiced to two coworkers and two supervisors, were "motivated by 
and dealt with her individual employment situation" and thus were 
not a matter of public concern.  Id. at 143.  The court reasoned 
that because there was "no indication that the plaintiff 'wanted 
to debate issues of sex discrimination,' that her suit 'sought 
relief against pervasive or systemic misconduct by a public 
agency or public officials,' or that her suit was 'part of an 
overall effort . . . to correct allegedly unlawful practices or 
bring them to public attention.'"  Id. (quoting Yatvin v. Madison 
Metro. Sch. Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)).   
     In Bedford v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans. Auth., 867 F. 
Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1994), the court analyzed a police 
dispatcher's complaint of sexual harassment by police officers 
and an undersheriff as follows: 
          Had plaintiff publicly complained of sexual 
     harassment, her statement would clearly relate to a 
     matter of legitimate public concern.  Where one voices 
     an internal complaint of an act of harassment or 
     discrimination to secure some personal advantage, the 
     complaint is arguably a matter of private interest 
     only. 
          Where, however, one complains to her employer of 
     alleged sexual harassment . . . not to secure personal 
     gain but to expose and protect herself and other female 
     employees in the future from such conduct, the court 
     concludes that it does touch upon a matter of 
     legitimate public concern. 
 
Id. at 295-96 (internal citations omitted).  Under Bedford, 
internal complaints intended only to secure relief or protection 
for the complainant are not protected, while internal allegations 
intended to inform and protect others are comprehended by the 
First Amendment.  See also Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th 
Cir. 1993) (finding that correctional officer's sexual harassment 
allegations against lieutenants, which consisted entirely of 
complaints to official bodies, were not a matter of public 
concern because they were made solely to further the plaintiff's 
personal interest in improving the conditions of her employment), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2708 (1994); Woodward v. City of 
Worland, 977 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that 
dispatchers' formal complaints of sexual harassment by police 
officers and undersheriffs did not constitute a matter of public 
concern because the thrust of plaintiffs' allegations was that 
they personally were being harassed and wanted that harassment to 
stop), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 923 (1993); Wilson v. UT Health 
Center, 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that UTHC police 
sergeant's reports of sexual harassment perpetrated on several 
women including herself by UTHC police officers constituted a 
matter "of great public concern"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1004 
(1993).  While these courts have articulated slightly different 
standards, they have unanimously agreed that reports of sexual 
harassment must somehow transcend the personal employment dispute 
in which they are rooted--for example, by publicly exposing 
official malfeasance or protecting others from similar treatment- 
-in order to gain protected status.  
     While we agree with the basic principle that allegations of 
sexual harassment must somehow transcend the complainant's 
personal employment dispute in order to gain protected status, we 
believe that the above cited authorities interpret the phrase 
"tied to a personal employment dispute" more broadly than the 
Supreme Court intended it.  To determine whether speech is 
protected, courts must examine the "content, form, and context of 
a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."  Connick, 
461 U.S. at 147-48 (emphasis added).  The fact that speech arose 
in the context of a personal employment dispute may be a relevant 
factor in making that determination, but it is not dispositive-- 
i.e., speech is not considered to be "tied to a personal 
employment dispute"--unless the content, form and context of the 
speech reveal that it does not concern a matter of public import.  
To hold otherwise would be to contravene the principle that "a 
public employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights to 
comment upon matters of public interest by virtue of government 
employment."  Id. at 140. 
     In Callaway and Morgan, however, the courts apparently 
decided on the basis of context and form only that the speech at 
issue was tied to a personal employment dispute.  Because the 
plaintiffs in those cases were motivated by a desire to improve 
the conditions of their own employment, and voiced internal 
complaints of sexual harassment, the courts concluded that their 
speech was tied to a personal employment dispute and hence not 
protected.  Callaway, 832 F.2d at 417 ("We agree with the 
district court that "[i]n this case, the context and form of the 
speech leads to the inescapable conclusion that . . . 
[Callaway's] concern was personal, not public."); Morgan, 6 F.3d 
at 755 (finding speech unprotected because it "was driven by 
[plaintiff's] own entirely rational self-interest in improving 
the conditions of her employment" and because plaintiff "did not 
relate her concerns about sexual harassment to the public, or 
attempt to involve the public in any manner") (footnote omitted).  
This curtailed inquiry, which elevates employment context and 
speaker motivation over content, contravenes the three-part test 
(content, form, and context) set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Connick.  Under this three-pronged inquiry, speech is only wholly 
tied to a personal employment dispute if nothing in its content 
is relevant to the public; even if speech arises in the context 
of a personal employment dispute, it will be protected if its 
content touches on a matter of public concern.  Connick, 461 U.S. 
at 147-49; see also Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1271 (stating that 
speech by public employees which relates to their employment is 
speech on a matter of public concern unless its content is purely 
personal in nature).   
     Supreme Court cases dealing with the protected status of 
employment-related speech by public employees have clearly and 
consistently indicated that even speech arising from a personal 
employment dispute will be protected if its content touches on a 
matter of public concern.  In Connick, for example, the Court 
looked closely at the content of the speech at issue as well as 
its context and form to determine whether it was tied to a 
personal employment dispute, noting that "the questionnaire, if 
released to the public, would convey no information at all other 
than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status 
quo."  461 U.S. at 148.  Subsequently, while discussing the 
distinction between speech as a citizen on matters of public 
concern and speech as an employee on matters of only personal 
interest in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 
the Court stated that: 
     [P]rivate speech that involves nothing more than a 
     complaint about a change in the employee's own duties 
     may give rise to discipline without imposing any 
     special burden of justification on the government 
     employer.  If, however, the speech does involve a 
     matter of public concern, the Government bears the 
     burden of justifying its adverse employment action. 
 115 S. Ct. at 1013.  This language confirms that the phrase "tied 
to a personal employment dispute" is a question of content as 
well as context; the Court clearly indicated that speech that 
arises in the context of a personal employment dispute andconcerns issues 
that would interest only the individual 
complainant--such as the scope of his or her duties on the job-- 
is not protected, whereas speech that involves a matter of public 
concern, whether rooted in a personal employment dispute or not, 
is protected.   
     To the extent that the above cited cases have concluded that 
internal complaints of sexual harassment leveled against public 
officials are not protected, they are also in conflict with Third 
Circuit case law regarding the relevance of the speaker's 
motivation to the First Amendment inquiry.  This court has held 
that a speaker's motivation for speaking is "one factor to be 
considered" in determining whether speech is protected, but 
"complete reliance on . . . motivation . . . is inappropriate."  
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1201 (3d Cir. 1988).  The 
message of Rode is that even if a speaker was motivated by purely 
personal considerations, such as stopping a pattern of harassment 
or improving the conditions of her employment, her speech may 
still be protected if its content touches on a matter of public 
concern.  Under the approach taken by the Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits, however, a finding that the speaker was motivated by a 
desire to improve the conditions of her employment is, in and of 
itself, sufficient to render her speech unprotected, regardless 
of the specific content of that speech.  Morgan, 6 F.3d at 754 
("[W]e must determine whether the purpose of Morgan's speech was 
to raise issues of public concern, on the one hand, or to further 
her own private interest, on the other."); Callaway, 832 F.2d at 
417 (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Connickrequires courts 
to look at the point of the speech in question).  
In sum, we conclude that speech is a matter of public concern if 
it discloses malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of a public 
official of sufficient gravity to be of legitimate interest to 
members of the community.  Whether the subject of a communication 
is such a matter is of course a fact-sensitive inquiry.  
     In this case, we are convinced by the form, context andcontent of 
plaintiff's speech that it has sufficient public 
elements to merit First Amendment protection, notwithstanding the 
fact that it is rooted in a personal employment dispute.  
Plaintiff testified that she reported the alleged harassment to 
Director of Administration Sal Sirabella, who is the official 
ultimately responsible for deciding what official action to take 
in response to complaints of sexual harassment, seeking advice as 
to what she should do.  According to plaintiff, Sirabella 
responded that she should simply "leave it alone for now."  App. 
147.  Thus, Azzaro reported the incident as fully as the County, 
through Sirabella, actually required her to do.  Plaintiff's 
report to Sirabella, "if released to the public," Connick, 461 
U.S. at 148, would expose the alleged malfeasance of a government 
official who is a close personal advisor to the Commissioner.  We 
believe that where, as here, a complainant reports sexual 
harassment by a public official, her speech touches on a matter 
of public concern even if motivated by purely personal 
considerations, because it exposes the potential malfeasance of a 
public official.  See id.; Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1271 (stating 
that "speech disclosing public officials' misfeasance is 
protected").  If a government employee complained of not 
receiving a promotion because she failed to pay a bribe demanded 
by her superior, that speech would be a matter of public concern, 
even though her sole interest was to obtain the promotion.  
Complaints of sexual harassment by government officials do not 
cease to be matters of public concern simply because the 
complainant seeks solely to have some personal right vindicated.  
A personal desire for confidentiality or relief limited to the 
complainant cannot and should not transform a matter of public 
concern into one that is solely private.  Indeed, when a public 
employee reports an incident of sexual harassment by a public 
official in the manner specifically set forth by the government 
agency for whom she works, thereby calling the malfeasance of a 
government official to the attention of the relevant authorities 
in the manner prescribed by those authorities, we would be hard- 
pressed to conclude that her speech does not expose the 
malfeasance of a public official or constitute a matter of public 
concern.     
     Although we conclude solely on the basis of plaintiff's 
report to the appropriate county official that her speech was 
protected, we note that several additional factors lend support 
to that conclusion.  First, plaintiff's meeting with Sirabella 
provides evidence of motive--a relevant, albeit not dispositive, 
factor in the public concern inquiry.  Swineford, 15 F.3d at 
1272.  Thus, even if Sirabella had not been the official in 
charge of sexual harassment reports, we believe that plaintiff's 
conversation with him evidences an intent to expose the 
malfeasance of a public official.  Second, unlike the plaintiff 
in Callaway, Azzaro told many co-workers of her complaint, and 
there was evidence that rumors regarding the incident were 
widespread in the office.  This informal broadcasting is 
inconsistent with a desire to resolve the issue privately, and 
suggests that plaintiff may have sought to publicize the incident 
for non-personal reasons.  A reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that plaintiff sought to disclose the malfeasance of one of the 
Commissioner's close personal advisors and warn other women in 
the office of his actions. 
     We are persuaded that our holding today that an internal 
report by a public employee of sexual harassment by a government 
official is a matter of public concern makes sense for public 
policy reasons as well as legal precedential ones.  The general 
principle that speech which is wholly tied to a personal 
employment dispute is unprotected cannot be inflexibly and 
blindly applied; rather, the public or private nature of such 
speech must be evaluated in light of the surrounding 
circumstances.  Sexual harassment presents a unique circumstance 
in which personal elements and public concerns are almost 
invariably intermingled and social pressures toward silence can 
be overwhelming.  Ample evidence has demonstrated that sexual 
harassment is an issue which its victims find extremely difficult 
to discuss privately, much less publicly.  Given the inherent 
difficulty of broaching the topic of sexual harassment and 
disclosing such a sensitive problem to one's coworkers and/or 
community, we believe that greater flexibility is required in 
weighing the personal employment dispute aspects of the speech 
against its more public elements than the above-cited authorities 
allow.  We cannot believe that the First Amendment protects only 
those victims of sexual harassment who either speak out for 
purely selfless reasons or are bold enough to shout their 
accusations "over the roofs of the world."  Walt Whitman, Song of 
Myself, Leaves of Grass, in The Portable Walt Whitman 32, 96 
(1973). 
     Because we conclude that plaintiff's report to Sirabella is 
sufficient to make her speech regarding a personal incident of 
sexual harassment by a government official a matter of public 
concern, we will reverse the district court's ruling on this 
issue. 
                                2. 
     The district court also found that plaintiff had failed to 
satisfy the second prong of the Swineford test: establishing that 
the speech at issue was a "substantial or motivating factor in 
her discharge."  Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1270.  For the reasons 
stated in our discussion of causation under Title VII in Part 
III.A above, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that 
plaintiff established a causal link between the protected speech 
and her termination.  Accordingly, we will reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on this ground as well. 
     Having reversed the district court's rulings on both of the 
first two prongs of the Swineford test, we will remand to the 
district court for further proceedings with respect to 
plaintiff's section 1983 claim. 
                               IV. 
     Count III of plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim under the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S.  955 et seq.  The 
district court initially exercised supplemental jurisdiction over 
the claim, but subsequently dismissed the claim pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1367(c)(3) in light of its ruling on defendants' motion 
for summary judgment.  28 U.S.C.  1367(c)(3) (providing that a 
district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a claim . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all 
claims over which it has original jurisdiction").  In light of 
our ruling today, we conclude that this dismissal was 
inappropriate and we hereby reverse it.   
                                V. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's order granting summary judgment to defendants on Counts I 
and II and dismissing Count III, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
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 ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
     I join in Parts I, II, IIIA, IV, and V of the majority's 
opinion.  Although the evidence is tenuous, I agree that there 
may be sufficient facts in dispute that, if the plaintiff's 
version is believed, could lead a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that Azzaro was discharged in retaliation for her 
complaints of harassment.  The majority also believes that there 
was sufficient evidence to conclude that the plaintiff was 
discharged as a result of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.  What separates me from the majority is its analysis 
and disposition of the First Amendment issue.  I do not regard 
this amendment to be of lesser importance than does the majority, 
but I am unwilling to drape its majestic protection of freedom of 
speech around idle personal prattle. 
     I strongly disagree with the majority's dogmatic assertion 
that a public employee's complaints of sexual harassment by a 
fellow employee "are inherently of public concern even if made in 
a private forum," Maj. op. at 2, line 20, and its resulting 
conclusion that Azzaro's belated conversation with Sirabella "is 
sufficient to make her speech regarding a personal incident of 
sexual harassment by a government official a matter of public 
concern," Maj. op. at 33, and thus protected by the First 
Amendment.  Because I believe that such a sweeping rule has the 
dangerous effect of elevating casual conversation to the level of 
constitutionally protected speech, seriously impeding normal 
discourse and management problems in the workplace, and inciting 
frivolous litigation, I must dissent from Part IIIB of the 
majority opinion. 
 
                                I. 
     Over twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court set forth a 
solid framework for analyzing claims of First Amendment violation 
by a public employee terminated or disciplined because of his or 
her speech.  In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968), the Court held that employees had a First Amendment right 
to speak on issues of public concern.  There, a teacher wrote a 
letter to a local newspaper in connection with a proposed tax 
increase by the school board in which he criticized past 
proposals to raise new revenue for the schools.  Whether a school 
system requires funds is a matter of legitimate concern for the 
community as a whole and on "such a question free and open debate 
is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate."  
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-2.  The exercise of her right to speak 
on this issue could not furnish the basis for dismissal from 
employment.  Id., at 574.  On the other hand, if a public 
employee speaks out "not as a citizen upon matters of public 
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal 
interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court 
is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a 
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction 
to the employee's behavior."  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 
(1983).  The proper inquiry in determining whether Azzaro's 
allegations deserve the protection of the First Amendment, then, 
is whether her speech was on a matter of public concern.  This 
inquiry is one of law; therefore, we review the district court's 
determination de novo.  Id., at 148 n.7. 
     I agree with the majority that to determine whether the 
speech is on a matter of public concern, the court must examine 
"the content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed 
by the whole record."  Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.  I believe, 
however, that the majority fails to make this analysis.  Rather, 
it adopts what amounts to almost a per se rule that speech by a 
public employee about sexual harassment is always protected by 
the First Amendment.  "As a general rule we believe that the 
topic of sexual harassment of employees by a public official is 
one `inherently of public concern.'"  Maj. op. at 20, quotingConnick, 461 
U.S. at 148, n.8.  It reaches this result by 
incorporating several words of Connick dealing with racial 
discrimination and fusing them with a question of sexual 
harassment.  The majority then stretches this generalization 
still further to extend First Amendment protection to situations 
such as Azzaro's, by characterizing her speech as a "report" when 
it was nothing more than an attempt to seek advice several months 
after the incident from the Director of Administration on how to 
keep from becoming a pawn in a political struggle. 
     We have previously noted that speech is on a matter of 
public concern when it can fairly be considered as relating to 
any matter of political, social or other concern to the 
community.  Swineford v. Snyder County, Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 1270- 
71 (3d Cir. 1994); Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  In many situations, discussion of sexual harassment 
is a matter of community concern and thus implicates the First 
Amendment.  Under some situations, too, discussions of office 
morale and discipline procedures in the district attorney's 
office could also be such a matter of public concern.  However, 
in the particular fact situation presented in Connick, the Court 
found that an employee's speech regarding office morale and 
discipline was not of public concern.  See Connick 461 U.S. at 
148, n.8. 
     The issue is not whether the subject matter could, in other 
circumstances, be the proper topic of a communication of public 
concern.  The question is whether the content of the 
communication at hand, in the manner and context in which it was 
communicated, is a matter of public concern or only of private 
grievance.  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-9, n.10; Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)(employer may not divorce 
employee's statements from the context in which they were made); 
Holder v. City of Allentown, supra (whether speech is on a matter 
of public concern is determined by the context, form and content 
of the speech).  The majority, in attempting to recognize the 
egregious nature of sexual harassment, has missed this crucial 
step of the analysis. 
     In the case at hand, this step demonstrates that Azzaro's 
communications were not on a matter of public concern.  Rather, 
the context, form and content of her statements supports the 
conclusion that her speech was on a matter of personal interest 
only, precisely what is not protected by the First Amendment.  
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. 
     Azzaro related her alleged experience in Fusaro's office to 
approximately five or six personal friends at different times at 
her place of employment within the few weeks following the 
incident.  The chit-chat with these people were not official 
reports.  She never spoke to Sirabella, the official responsible 
to take action on complaints of sexual harassment, until some 
months after the alleged incident, and even then, not by way of 
an official report but to seek advice on keeping her 
